Imagine strolling down the streets on a peaceful night in Honolulu and breathing in the fresh salt sea air. Feel the tiny detonation of air pressure as an orange glow lights up the cloud cover far out over the ocean. What could it be? As you wonder, the closest streetlight winks out.
Months before the Cuban Missile Crisis, the United States lit up the skies of the Pacific with its first nuclear test in outer space: Starfish Prime. Its electromagnetic pulse and radiation damaged multiple satellites in orbit and knocked out electrical appliances in Honolulu (some 900 miles from the detonation point), clearly demonstrating the catastrophic potential of nuclear weapons in outer space. A year later, the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed the Partial Test Ban Treaty, formally making nuclear weapons in outer space taboo.
Earlier this year, reports of Russia developing a nuclear-armed anti-satellite (ASAT) weapons system raised alarms. Such an act could begin a new nuclear arms race and bring outer space to the brink of catastrophe. To prevent this, the U.S. should initiate the development of a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) with clauses that explicitly outline a nuclear weapon-free outer space and ban nuclear-armed ASAT weapons.
In the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, the U.S. and the Soviet Union agreed to an outright ban of nuclear arms in space. Policy decisions and further nuclear arms agreements have reinforced this taboo since then, so Russia’s decision to develop a nuclear-armed ASAT system raises an immediate question: why? Has the balance of power shifted so much in outer space that Russia truly sees value in violating such a long-lived taboo?
I would argue that the answer is an emphatic “No.” Russia has as much to gain from the rapid democratization of orbital space as anyone else. Where Russia — or, more accurately, Putin — does see value is in forcing others to react to its actions and gaining a semblance of control.
Placing a nuclear weapon in orbit would be a direct and indiscriminate threat to thousands of satellites that benefits no one. As seen with Starfish Prime, the result of any detonation cannot be targeted. It would wreak havoc upon all at once and could potentially make orbital space radioactively unstable for years. However, because Russia’s footprint in orbital space has comparatively diminished to that of the U.S. and other nations, the risk/reward ratio of that outcome would be smaller for Russia than for others. This calculation alone could explain the country’s potentially dangerous behavior.
Detonating a nuclear weapon in outer space may not benefit anyone, but placing one in orbit — or even posturing to do so — as a general threat would effectively force a response. This type of risky strategy (see the Cuban Missile Crisis) was the basis of the Cold War and the original arms race between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Russia is simply perpetuating the same risk/reward strategy that dominated the Soviet Union’s behavior in the last century. Instead of allowing similar consequences to play out this time, let’s learn from our history. Let’s bypass the crisis and cut straight to the new treaty. A new START, with clauses that guarantee a nuclear-free outer space and ban nuclear-armed ASAT systems, could avoid a new nuclear arms race and set a new paradigm for the peaceful use of outer space. Home run.
There are those who balk at the idea of coming to any arrangement with Russia, and that’s understandable. To be clear, Russia’s aggressive behavior in recent years is unconscionable, and the U.S. should not pursue any actions that would feed that behavior. However, as mentioned earlier, the risk/reward ratio for Russia is low and for the U.S. very high. Even if Russia never finishes developing nuclear ASAT weapons, it would only be a matter of time before China or some other nation does.
And why wouldn’t they? I don’t think it’s a coincidence that Russian nuclear posturing and aggression in space has increased since the U.S. announced the Space Force in March 2018. From announcing new nuclear delivery systems in 2018 to testing an ASAT weapon in 2021 to threatening nuclear strikes and attacks on satellites during the war in Ukraine to potentially placing a nuclear weapon in space, Russia escalates out of fear. The Space Force may not have been created to weaponize space, but it certainly sends a powerful signal to the rest of the world that the U.S. could.
Russia is afraid of that outcome and of being left out.
So let’s bind Russia to another treaty. Let’s set the precedent of behavior. By leading with diplomacy and stability, the U.S. can forge the end it desires. We can find a way to equalize the risk/reward ratio so that the taboo of nuclear space continues far into the future.
We can keep the streetlights on, providing a safe and clear path to follow.
Kendall Marston is a second-year graduate student in the ISTP program concentrating on Space Policy at George Washington University. A veteran of the U.S. Army, he holds a Bachelor’s degree in History and his current studies center on the intersection between national security, international diplomacy, and outer space exploration.
